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Long before John Young and Robert Crippen stepped aboard Space Shuttle 
Columbia for its first trip into space 
on April 12, 1981 , theIr new vehicle 
had been tested, and tested 
thoroughly. In wind tunnel 
experiments in the mid-1970's, 
engineers had verified the vehicle's 
basic aerodynamic design with scale 
models. Later, in 19n, the first 
Orbiter Enterprise had been dropped 
from a carrier aircraft for five 
manned Approach and Landing 
Tests to prove its ability to glide 
through the atmosphere and land 
like an airplane. 
One by one, the Space Shuttle's 
components were tested and 
declared ready : the main engines at 
NASA's National Space Technology 
Laboratories in Mississippi : the solid 
rocket motors at a test range in Utah : 
computer software and insulating 
tiles at several NASA centers and 
contractor plants. Tti9 entire mated 
assembly of Orbiter, solid rockets and 
external fL'91 tank was ct1ecked out in 
ground vipration tests completed in 
February, 1979 at the Marshall Space 
Flight Center in Alabama. Finally, in 
February, 1981 came the Flight 
Readiness Firing of Columbia's main 
propulsion engines on the launch 
pad at Kennedy Space Center in 
Florida. 
But until April , 1981 there was no 
proof of the Shuttle as an integrated 
Space Transportation System capable 
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of reaching Earth 0: bit, performing 
useful work there, and returning 
safely to the ground. This was the 
purpose of the Orbital Flight Test 
(OFT) program-to verify the 
Shuttle's performance under real 
spaceflight conditions, and to 
establish its readiness for operational 
duty. During four manned flights of 
Columbia conducted from April. 1981 
to July, 1982 the Shuttle was tested in 
its many capacities as a launch 
vehicle, living quarters. freight 
handler. instrument platfor:-n and 
aircraft. Ground operations before, 
during and after each launch v.-ere 
also evaluated. 
Following the landing of STS-4 on 
July 4, 1982 the Space Transportation 
Syst'3m was declared operational-
payload requirements would. :rom 
that point on, take precedence over 
spacecraft testing. With nearly 95% 
of its objectives accorT,iJlished, the 
Orbital Flight Test (OFT) program 
was also declared a success, even 
though further testing and expansion 
of the SI uttle's capabilities were 
planned on operational flights. 
The OFT progr8m consisted of 
more than 1100 carefully outlined 
tests and data collections. Many 
;::omponents were tested by 
functioning as planned-if an engine 
valve or an insulating tile worked 
normally, then its de ~ign was verified. 
Still oLlers, like the Remote 
Manipulator System arm, were put 
through rigorous validation runs to 
The fim orbiter Enterprise never 
rocketed into space, but it was 
tested aerodynamically during Ap-
proach and Landing Tests in 19n. 
check out different capa.bilities. Final 
documentation of Shuttle 
performance during OFT took into 
account the reports from astronaut 
crews, 9round observations and 
measurements, and data from Orbiter 
instruments and special 
Developmental Flight Instrumentation 
(OFI) that collected and recorded 
temperatures and accelerations at 
various points around the vehicle and 
moti:)n from points around the 
Shuttle. The OFI instruments were 
removed from Columbia after STS-5, 
while the solid rocket boosters were 
scheduled to carry them through 
STS-10. 
The guiding philosophy of the test 
program was to expand the Shuttle's 
perfor:-nance "envelope," or range of 
operation. toward the iimits of its 
de~ig:1 in careful increm'3;'1ts. Each 
flight increased the various structural 
and th~rmal stresses on the vehicle. 
bvth in space and in the atmosphere, 
by a pl:mned amount. 
The orimary goal of Columbia's 
first flight was to "get up and dow 
safely" and verify the Shuttle's most 
basic task of reach ing orbit and 
return ing to Earth. Mission 
Commander John Young a!1d Pilot 
Robert Crippen were launched from 
Kennedy Space Center on April 12. 
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1981 and landed on a dry lakebed at
Edwards Air Force Base in Califomia
on April 14. Stresses on the vehicle
were kept to a minimum for this first
flight, and the only cargo weights
were the Data Flight Instrumentation(DFI) and the Aerodynamic
Coefficient Identification Package(ACIP^ ACIP was a group of
accelerometers and gyros included
on all test flights to gather
aerodynamic data during the
Shuttle's atmospheric flight. STS-1
successfully demonstrated two vital
spacecraft systems: the payload bay
doors with their attached heat
radiators and the Reaction Control
System thrusters used for attitude
control in orbit.
Originally scheduled for five days,
the STS-2 mission had to be cut
short because one of Columbia's
three electricity-generating fuel cells
failed shorty after the vehicle
reached orbit. Commander Joe Engle
and Pilot Richard Truly still managed
to achieve most of their flight
objectives during the 54-hour mission
from November 12 to November 14,
1981. Milestones for STS-2 were the
first tests of the Remote Manipulator
System's 1 5-meter (50 foot) arm and
the successful operation of Earth-
viewing instruments in the cargo bay.
Most importantly STS-2 proved the
Shuttle's re-usability
The third mission was the Longest
of the test series. Commander Jade
Lousma and Pilot Gordon Fullerton
were launched on March 22, 1982
and landed on March 30 at the White
Sands Missile Range's Northrup Strip
in New Mexico, a backup site chosen
after rains flooded the normally dry
lakebed at the prime landing site in
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California High winds at While
Sands also caused a delay in
landing, extending the week-long
mission to eight days
JUSt as STS had featurtxd the
Shuttle's first Earth-viewing payload.
STS-3 launched the first space-
viewing irntrunlentS, a Collection Of
,1Stionomic,ll and space-environment
sensors designated OSS-1 (after their
sponsor. NAtiAs Office of Space
Science) STS-3 ContInUed with
testing of the Remote Manipulator
System arm. carried the first Student
developed experiment (a study of
insect flight in weightlessness) in the
Cibitt`i s mid deck cabin and began
all urlpof tan) series tit thermal tests
of the 4)acecrafl
The fourth Shuttle nussron
commanded b y T k Mattingl y with
Heniv fi,u tsf eld, Ji as Pilot
completed the OFT plogiam STS-4
was launched on June 27, 1982 ants
landed on July 4 Among the
accomplish Int`Iits t`f this I(vt test
fligtlt were contit%jed thermal
testing, validation of the Remote
Will pul.alor tiyste^m, the transport of
Shuttles first Department Of Detense,
cargo the first prvately tended
Getaway Special, and the fist
landing in a hard surface runway
Getting Into Orbit:
The Rockets
The sequence of events for a
Shuttle Iaunc h begins with a start
cenlnland to the Orbiter s thee nt,lin
liquid-fi-ifled engines, followed by
seve g al Noc omds of thrust buildup
before the twin Solid Rocket
Boosters ignitt` release from their
hold-down mechanisms. and lift th%
entity` Shuttle assembly front the lead
An early and very sigmficant
hndinq of the test program v,,1S Viat
th- ,
 waler deluge system designed to
suPpiesS the POwt`1h11 ACOUStIC
pressurt`s of WWII would need to be
rewisekl after the Shoal from the
booster lockets was seen to be much
larger than anticipated for STS-1 In
the seconds oefore and after liftoff, a
1,11Mkrd° delude Syslern hat) poured
tens of thousands of gaillelnS of w,rtt'r
onto the launch plaltcrm and into
flame trenches beneath the toc Lets
It, absorb sound energy that night
otherwise damage the Orbiter or its
sensitive cargo titian) gages  tind
microphones wort! LIS-M to meaSUre
the acoustic shock, and they showed
Lip to four tin ges the pretlictetl vllueS
in parts of the vehicle closest to ;he
launch pad
Although COIu YINd Suffered nu
critir,ll d,rm,lge, the sound
suppression systetm had to be
modified befoir the launch of STS .`
Rather than dumpnlel Into the bottom
M the flames trenches, water was now
injeckM directly Into the exhaust
plumes (If the booSter 10CIN ` f\ at d
ptanl lust below the exhaust no:tles
M the linit` of ignition In addition.
energy-Absorbing Miter troughs wt`Ie
placed Over the exhaust openings
The changes weir enough to )educe
acoustic pleasures tO V Aro
Of STS 1 levels tot the second
launch. and they remained at
acceplablt ,
 levels fol all subset)llenl
MISSIOWS
STS 1 wdS the tlISl OPPOltunrty to
observe` the Shuttles ,uldy of Solld
anti Iiguld rockets x; a combnled
t
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propulsion system. On all Orbital
Flight Test flights. slow motion
carneras mounted on the Lunch pad
documented main engine and sold
rocket firing as well as the Shuttles
ascent from the pad Engine
performance was assessed by
examining the ascent trajectories for
all four flights. reviewing vehicle data
and by post-flight inspections.
Main Propulsion System
At the end of Orbital Flight Tests.
Columbias main engines had been
demonstrated successfully up to
1000 0 of their rated power level
(upgraded engines will throttle to
1090 o of this level on later flights) and
down to 65%. Designed to provide
1 .67 million Newtons (375.000
pounds) of thrust each at sea level
for an estimated 55 missions. the
engines were on target to meet these
guidelines at the end of the test
program. They met al! recuirements
for start and cutoff timing, thrust
direction control and the flow of
propellants. As engineers learned
more about the systems fuel
efficiency, and as ground crews
improved propellant loading
techniques, extra fuel margins were
also reduced.
The Shuttle was tested in its
launch phase by planning
increasingly more demanding ascent
conditions for each test flight, and
ther by comparing predicted flight
characteristics with data returned
from ACIP and DFI instruments and
ground tracking. Columbia lifted
slightly heavier payloads into space
on each mission. The altitudes and
speeds at which the solid rockets
and external tank separated were
varied. as was the steepness of the
vehicles climb and main engine
throttling times. All of these changes
corresponded to a gradual increasing
0
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over the course of the test program
in the maximum dynamic pressure.
or peak aerodynamic stress. inflicted
on the vehicle. Maximum dynamic
pressure for the STS-1 ascent was
607 pounds per square foot (psf).
I	 This was raised to 640 psf for STS-2.
f
	
	
650 psf for STS-3 and finally to 703
psf for STS-4. The Shuttles
f
	
	
operational limit is 819 psf. At no
time did Columbia experience any
significant problems with the
aerodynamic or heat stresses of
asceri.
A .major milestone in the test
program was the shift (after STS-2)
from using wind tunnel data for
computing Columbus ascent path to
using aerodynamic data derived from
the first two flights On STS 1 and 2
the ShL.ttle showed a slight lofting-
;
	
	
about ..000 meters (10.000 feet) at
main engine cutoff—above its
f
	
	 planned trajectory. This was due to
the inakility of wind- t unnel models to
simulate the gf terbL , rning of hot
exhaust gasses in the real
U	 6
atmosphere. Beginning with the third
flight. the thrust of the booster
rockets was re-oriented slightly to
reduce this lofting.
On STS 3 and 4. however the
trajectory was seen to be too shallow.
in part due to a slower than
predicted burn rate for the solid
boosters that had also been observed
on the first two flights. Engineers
continued to use OFT data after
STS-4 to refine their predictions of
this solid propellant burn rate so that
ascent trajectories could be planned
as accurately as possible on future
missions. In all cases the combined
propulsion of main engines, sold
boosters and Orbital Maneuvering
System engines delivered the Shuttle
to its desired orbit.
STS-4 was the first mis..ion !n orbit
at a 28 5 inclination to the equator.
The first flights flew more steeply
inclined orbits (38-40 ) that took
them over more ground tracking
stations The more equatorial STS-4
inclination is favored because it gives
Twin solid rockets separate from the
External Tank, then parachute down
to the Atlantic Ocean for recovery.
Because there were problems with
Separation of the parachutes during
the test flights, they wem, left
attached to the rockets after water
impact on STS-5.
the vehicle a greater boost from the
rotating Earth at launch. The first two
flights also verified that the vehicle
has enough energy to press on to an
emergency landing in Spain or
Senegal, as abort options, should
two main engines fail during ascent.
After STS-5 the crew ejection seats
were removed from Columbia.
eliminating the option to eject, and
ending the need for astronauts to
wea r pressure suits during launch.
Solid Rocket Boosters
On each test flight. the twin Solid
Rocket Boosters. the lar gest ever
flown and the first designed for re-
use, provided evenly matched thrust,
shut off at the same times and
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separated as planned from the
external tank, then parachuted down
to their designated recovery area in
the Atlantic Ocean for towing back to
the mainland and re-loadino with
solid propellant. Fach booster has
three main parachutes that inflate
fully about twenty seconds before
water impact. Prior to the test flights.
these parachutes were designed to
separate automatically from the
boosters by means of explosive bolts
when the rockets hit the water, since
it was thought chat recovery would be
easier if the chutes were not still
attached
On the first and third flights.
however, some parachutes sank
before recovery. Then, on STS-4, the
separation bolts fired prematurely
due to strong vibrations, the
parachutes detached from the
rockets before water impact, and the
rockets hit the water at too great a
speed and sank. They were not
recovered. As a result of these
problems. the recovery hardware and
procedures were altered beginning
with STS-5 Instead of separating
automatically with explosives. the
parachutes remained attached to the
boosters through water impact. and
were detached once the recovery
team arrived. There were also
sections of the boosters
strengthened as a result of water
impact damage seen on the test
flights.
External Tank
The Shuttle's huge «Emal fuel
tank at 47 metes (154 feet) high. is
taller than many office buildings. The
tanl, met all nerformance standards
for OFT Heat sensors have shown
ascent temperatures to be moderate
encugh to allow p'arwed reductions
in the thickness 2, rd wE ight of the
tank's insulation Beginning with
STS-3. white paint on the outside of
the tank was left off to save another
243 kilograms (540 pounds) of
weight. leaving the tank the brown
color of its spray-on foam insulation.
Onboard cameras showed flawless
separation of the tank from the
Orbiter after the main engines cut off
on each flight, and Shuttle crews
report that this separation is so
sn Both that they cannot feel it
happening. To assist its breakup in
the atmosphere, the tank has a
pyrotechnic device that sets it
tumbling after separation rather than
skipp rig along the atmosphere like a
str, ne. This tumble device failed on
S7, S-1, but worked Herfectly on all
subsequent missions. On all the test
flights radar tracking of the tank
debris showed it to fall well within
the planned impact area in the Indian
Ocean.
Orbital Maneuvering System
Shortly after it separates from the
fuel tank, the Orbiter fires its two aft-
mounted Orbital Maneuvering
System engines for additional boosts
to higher and more circularized
orbits. At the end of orbital
operations, these engines are called
on again to decelerate the vet lole
and begin its fall to Earth. The
7
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engines performed 'these basic
functions during OFT with normal
levels of fuel consumption and
engine wear. Further testing included
startups after long periods of
idleness in vacuum and low gravity
(STS 1 and 2), exposure to cold
(STS-3) and exposure tc the Sun
(STS-4). Different methods of
distributing the system's propellants
were also demonstrated. Fuel from
the left tank was fed to the right tank
and vice versa. and from the Orbital
Maneuvering System tanks to the
smaller Reaction Control System
thrusters (they both ,use the same
combination of hydrazine and
nitrogen tetroxide) On STS-2 the
engine cross-feed was performed in
the middle of an engine burn to
simulate the engine's failure
OrbRal Operabons:
The Spacecraft
Once in space. an early priority for
any Shuttle mission is to open the
two large pay l oad bay doors with
their attached heat radiators. J the
doors do not open in orbit. the
Sr	 is not able to deploy
payloads or shed its waste heat If
they fail to close at missions end. re-
entry through the atmosphere is
impossible.
The STS-1 crew ran an important
series of payload bay door tests
during Columbia's first few hours in
space. The doers were first un;atched
from the bulkheads and from each
other One at a time they were
opened in the manual drive mode,
while TV cameras and the crew
recorded their motion The
movement of the doors was slightly
more jerky and hesitant in space
than in Earth-gravity simulations. but
this was expected, and did not affect
their successful opening and closing
The doors were closed and re-
opened again one day into the STS-1
mission as a further test, then closed
for good before re-entry The crew
verified normal alignment and
latching of the doors as did the
STS-2 crew during their door cyc,ing
tests. including one series in the
automatic mode.
Door cycling was also tested after
prolonged exposure to heat and cold
The doors are made of a graphite-
epoxy composite material. while the
Orbiter itself is made of aluminum It
was therefore important to
understand how they would fit
together after the aluminum
expanded or contracted in the
temperature extremes of space At
the beginning of STS-3 orbital
operations the doors were opened as
usual The payload bay was then
exposed to cold shadow for a period
of 23 ;lours When the port-side door
was closed at the end of this
coldsoak it faded to latch properly.
Orbital Maneuvering System
engines fire to place vehicle in orbit,
to change orbits, and to break out
of orbits at end of mission.
as it did after a similar cold exposure
on the STS-4 mission Apparently the
Orbiter warps very shahtly into a
banana shape with nose and tail
bent upward toward each other,
accounting in part for the doors
inability to clear the aft bulkhead
The solution on both flights was
the same, and has become standard
procedure for closing the doors
following a long cold exposure: the
Orbiter holds a top-to-Sun position
for 15 minutes to warm the cargo
bay, then undergoes a short
STS-1 tested payload bay doors and 	 which includes tyro Coolant loops
deployment of radiator panels (left)L
	
that transport waste heat front
Photo also shows blanketed "box" 	 01011vt and payload e-ot'UtonrCS to
of Data Flight Instrumentation (DFI) 	 the dOOr-mounted radiator panels for
In the rear of cargo bay. and
missing white tiles on a0t engine
pod (upper right ►
barbecue roll to even out vchi le
tempt'r,t!uR'S. ,111,1w1n.1 the doors it'
Clost , ,111d latch nofrlm 1 In addition
Ihen' have Iven hardwlrl , ih,lntlt's IO
the d0Or1 and tO tht` ,lit N1100,11d
d051t)n0d to unprovr • 01011 ; It',1r,111 t'
Thermal Tests
10 u • 1d0sland the shottlt`s
It l , It , 1It)II tt 1 1It , Ih0ItII,II OA III I II10S of
Sp,1C0 w,ts .1 k0V 0010iIM , of the 01 1
program anti th0rn1,11 tests
tICCOL111tt'd A' I hLiMilt'ds 01 hOWN Of
III!," Ion twit` Ih0 101111t • IatLin's of
spaceclafl Slruilurvs Can 011111.10
tiran1a11C,111V In space	 4,111
IhOU 0Ap0-,LI?' t4, • the tiun
Tenlpomturt'S 011 the SlnfaCO of
paVlOad b,1V In%LI lilt loll, f0I (ILample.
writ Non) ,1 low of	 96 l'1140 F1 t0
a poak of 1, 1 ; C (
.160 F) on IN, ::,IIIIV
tit ti-3 mission The tipace Shuttle
k001'S Its COnIj1OII0n1S withal Well
d051gne'ti 10n11><1 n1tur0 Imnts throu^lh
,101Ve' thermal Control soterll,
dunlptrlg .nlo space. and by the use
Of rrlsulahon anti hOdI0IS
The 0F1 program lostod this
ab111t1 to kt't'p cool ^d koop w:11111
untlt'r Cond111ons nhu.rl MOW
0^tn'n1r than ihr ,1vt11A^10 nuSSlOns
SIS ,i .1114,1 3 featLimd e\trntit'd
thermal soaks. whorl , Pail ,; of the
0101t01 Wert , dellbera101y heated up
or cooled down by holdnlg Cert,lln
Att1tudt'S n'IMIVt' to the tiun On
SIS- 14 the 01biter Was first held with
It', tall IO the tiun for :1
 hOUrS.
h0aling Its aft 011.11110S but COOluttl
the nost , ,111d payioad N,1% Following
that It held nose-lO-tiun lot 80 hours
i001111t) down those S,UnO 0101tal
Manotivot ing SystOnl 0n.1n10s anti
rt'actlon Control µ'1s F!nally the
payload bay vms hoate d bV holding
the OfNIers Irp 14,' 1110 SLin for 28
hours These lontl thermal soaks
weFt' separatt'd bV shorl0r 114 1 110ds of
b,U11e000 it'll for etrt'n 110,111nL1 On
ST 1,44 IN,
 lhorinai Soak tests
COM111110d with 10119 1,111-10-Sun and
1101tOnl-4,O tiun OApOSUrt'S
Overall, these hot and cold soak
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tests showed that the Shuttle has a
11e1 tter than prrodrettx1 thermal
stability STS -3 readings showed that
the Orbiters skin koot considerably
warmer during coldsoaks than had
been expected and that r lany critical
systems like the o-bltal rnaneuvrrrnq
onglnt'S were also walrnler Most
w'hicle slructunvs also tend tc heat
Lip Or Cool down at slower rates than
expected
The Active Thermal Control
System. with its coolant kvps and
space radiators, proved capable of
handling Shuttle heat loads In orbit
even Linder extrrrne cond.tions This
Is Important to know for !Litun'
missions whore InSUunit'nt p10111hng
nrgurnlntents may demand long
periods of Sun or shadow on parts
of the vrhlcle On A mission with
moderate heating and Cooling such
as STS-1 the total heat load on the
Active Thermal Control System was
follltll to be 151r lower than
e\ l,voted
The space radiators were tested
with rill night panels deployed, and
they proved capable of shedding
n1Ost heat loads with only half the
panels dep!oyed These radiators Arts
Nut One part of 1110 thermal C011trol
SubSVStertl DLIMItl ,1St-ent the
Shut r !t's lklSh evlporAtors transfer
heat hone c11CUlatl110 COO1a11t to
water. beginning abrut twet minutes
IMO the ascent when the vehicle Relit
retlt1lrt's aclm, ctioling These flash
evapOr,llors n0rn1,111V work Willi the
space radiator-, are opened In orbit
Then. at the end of the mission the
flash evlporatoiN art' reactmate d and
uSN dOwn to an ,11114u00 A
approximately 36,000 meters (120.000
feel) durin.l rh entry From that
alUtudO d0WII to thi s tPOLind the heal
is Shed Ny bor11ne1 aminonla rather
than wzitor
During OFT these drttprenr
nu'ihods of coollnq down were
SucceSShrIIV tested aS backups to
each other The flash 0vapolatom
proved capable of handling heal
loads In space for tt short while
without help from the radiators, and
9
PASSIVE THERMAL CONTROL	 TAIL TO SUN
(Barbecue Mode)
	 (Payload Bay to Space)
PAYLOAD TO SUN	 BOTTOM TO SUN
Thermal testing of Orbiter was accomplished by holding
different attitudes relative to the Sun for long periods.
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OFT Thermal Tests the (stowed) radiators were allowedto absorb some of the vehicle's
internal heat loads during re-entry,
bypassing the ammonia boilers.
Subsystems
All four of the two-man crews for
the test flight program were kept
busy every minute they were in orbit,
testing and re-testing the Shuttle's
main subsystems under varying
conditions, like new car owners
checking out their options On the
tour OFT flights virtually every one of
these systems—hydraulic, electrica:.
navigation and guidance,
communications and environmental
control—performed up tc. design
standards or better
The hydraulic subsystem that
controls movement of the Shuttles
engine nozzles. its airplane-like
control flags and its landing gear
functioned well during OFT launches
and re-entries Normally idle when
the Shuttle is in orbit, the hydraulic
system must keep its fluids warm
and ready for action. The hydraulic
system was tested successfully on
STS-2 by cycling the eleven controi
surfaces while in orbit. On STS-4 the
hydraulics were evaluated after a long
coldsoak, when it was found that
circulation pumps deed only operate
at minimal levels to keep the
hydraulic fluids above critical
temperatures These minimal duty
cycles for circulation pumps will save
on electrical power
Although an oil filter clog in the
hydraulic system's Auxiliary Power
Units delayed the launch of STS-2 by
more than a week, the problem did
not recur during the test program
The solution .r^as to use tighter seals
to prevent the oil from being
contaminated by the units hydrazine
fuel.
The same STS-2 mission was cut
short due to a failure of one of the
three Shuttle fuel cells that convert
supercold (cryogenic) hydrogen and
oxygen to electricity A clog in the
cells water flow lines (water for the
crew is produced as a by-product of
the fuel cell's generation of
10
electricity) was the cause of the
failure. and this problem was
remedied during OFT by adding
filters to the pipes An uplanned-for
benefit from this failure. though. was
a test of the vehicle using only two
fue' .;ells instead of three, which
were enough to h2ndle all electrical
need:. One concern before OFT was
that Uneven mixing of the cryogeric
hydrogen and oxygen in their
storage tanks would hinder their flow
to the fuel cells in low gravity. After
two tests for this effect with the tanks
nearly full and near!y empty. it did
not appear to be a significant
problem Partly as a result of the
Shuttles thermal stability e ectricity
consumption by the Orbiter proved
to be lower than expected ranging
from 14 to 11 kilowatts per hour in
orbit as opposed to the predicted 15
to 20 kilowatts.
The ability of the Shuttles
computers to control virtually every
phase of each mission from final
countdown sequencing to re-entry
was successfully demonstrated on all
flights. with only minor programming
changes being necessary du r ing ;;ie
test program. The on-orbit navigation
and guidance aids were checked out
thoroughly The Orbiter senses its
position in space by means of three
Inertial Measurement Units WAU s)
whose accuracy is checked and
periodically updated by a star trac!cer
located on the same navigation base
in the cockpit-like flight deck This
vital star tracker IMU alignment was
tested extensively on the first Shuttle
mission. including once when the
vehicle was rolling. and on all flights
their agreement was good The star
tracker was able to find its guide
stars both in darkness and in
daylight Its accuracy is better than
expected. and the enure navigation
instrument base showed its stability
under extreme thermal conditions
Crew optical alignments of the IMU's
were also demonstrated as a backup
Radio and TV communication were
successfully carved out on all four
flights with only minimal hardware
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and signal acquisition problems at
ground stations. Specific tests
checked different transmission
modes, radio voice through the
Shuttles rocket exhaust during
ascent, and UHF transmission as a
backup to the primary radio link
during launch and operations in
space All were successful. On STS-4
there was also an evaluation of how
different Orbiter attitudes affect radio
reception in space. important for
planning future missions.
The closed-circuit television system
inside the Orbiter and out in the
cargo bay gave high-quality video
images of operations in orbit. In
Sunlight and in artificial floodlighting
of the payload bay they showed the
necessary sensiiivity. range of vision.
remote control and video-recording
capabilities
Attitude Control
When in orbit. the Shuttle uses its
Reaction Control .system of 38
primary and 6 ,matter vernier
thrusters to control its position
(attitude) and to make small scale
translations. ' or movements. in
space. These lets are located in the
Orbiters nose area and on the aft
pons near the other laroer engines.
and they fire in different
combinations to move the Shuttle to
nearly any desired position. 'We
haven t taught it to dance yet, says a
Shuttle official but it can do lust
about anything else This important
subsystam was the object of
extensi ve testing heginning with
STS-1
The jets were evaluated in a
general way by seeing how the
Orbiter esponcled during a series of
attitude m p neuvers in space—vehicle
rolls around all three axes—roll. pitch
and yaw—and translations up-and-
down sideways. and forward-and-
backward Both primary and vernier
thrusters were test ' in these
validation runs Automatic and crew-
commanded manual reaction control
was demonstrated at different
velocities Under automatic controls
Columbia successfully changed and
requirements. such as star tracking
The thrusting power and propellant
use ge of bath types of lets were as
expected, with the smaller verniers
more fuel-efficient than expected
Two of the four vernier lets in
Columbia's tail area were seen to
have a problem with the downward
direction of their thrust The exhaust
hits the aft body flap and erodes
some of its protective tiles. which
also cuts down on the power of the
jets One solution being considered
after OFT was to re-orient these lets
slightly or future Orbiters. In the
meantime, a protective coating was
applied to the tiles on the body flap
The Orbiters ability to come to rest
after a manew/er was also
demonstrated. At faster ates it
proved nearly impossible to stop the
vehicles motion without
overshooting, then coming back to
the required ''stop position.
particularly with the large primary
engines Both types of thrusters were
used to keep the Orbiter steady in
'attitude hold postures. The small
lets were particularly successful and
fuel-efficient at this, holding the
vehicle steady doNn to ' ,, of a degree
of drift at normal rates of fuel use.
which is three time,, their required
sensitivity.
Thee was some concern after the
test program about the lifetime of the
vernier engines When it ^ -3s
discovered that a protective engine
coating had Prooed substantially on
two of these engines they were all
replaced with new ones after STS-4.
even though they had been designeo
to last 37 missions before being
replaced While testing continued to
determine why the coating eroded
mission planners attempted to
schedule more efficient use of the
small lets—they were Bred twice as
often as planned during the test
program, partly as a result of their
need to compensate for
overshooting and the need to hold
very steady attitudes for long periods
of time
0Further tests of the Reaciion
Control System assessed how well
Columbia could hold steadv without
firing ;ts jets. when differential forces
of gravity tend to tug the 3 7 meter
(122 foot)-Ierg vehicle out of
position The res:.ilts of these tests
looked promising for the use of
pass-ve gravit; , gradient attitudes
for future missions where steadiness
for short per.nds of time is required
without jet firings
Remote Manipulator System
One of the most important as well
as most time-consuming of all OFT
test series involved the 15 meter (50
foot) mechanical arm of the Remote
Manipulator System This Canadian-
built device, jointed like a human
arm at shoulder, elbow and wrist. is
attached to thA Orbiter at vacous
cradle poin,E running the length of
the ins de of the cargo bay It is an
optional piece of equipment used
only on missions where it is needed
to move objects into or out of the
cargo bay In place of a hand the arm
has a cylindncai "end effector" that
grapples a payload and holds it rigid
with 
-.,ire snares. The arm is
controlled by the crew from inside
the Orbiter and can be moved freely
around the vehicle in a number of
modes. with or without help from the
Shutt;e computers
All of the manual and automatic
drive modes were tested during CFT
as was the arms ability to grab a
payload firmly, remove it from a
stowed position. then re-berth it
STS-3 test instruments and
payloads. Nnte Canadian-built
Remote Manipulator System 2rnn at
right.
precisely and securely Lighting and
television cameras also r., cded to be
vPrrfied—the crew relies on sensitive
elbow and wrist cameras as well as
cameras mounted in the payload bay
to monitor day and night operations.
For the test program there were also
special Data Acquisition Cameras in
the cargo bay for documenting arm
motion
The first mission to carry the arm
was STS-2, and the crew of this
shortened flight ran an extensive
Imes of arm movements to test its
moNlity in space. Ground simulators
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C. Gordon Fullerton, STS -3 pilot,
with flight data and teleprinter copy
at pilot's station.
are not able to practice th ree-
d i mensional maneuvers because the
arm i; too fragile to support its own
weight in Earth gravity. The crew
began by releasing the arm, then
relatching it to the Orbiter. both in
the joint-by-point computer assisted
mode (the preferred method; and in
the direct wiring contingency mode
that '	 asses the computer. Once
this ability to deploy and re-stow the
arm was verified it was moved around
Columbia in validation runs to test all
points in all drive modes at differed
rates of speed. Fully automatic runs
were documented by videotape and
by analyzing the motor rates for each
joint They agreed well with pre-flight
predictions. and the crew watched as
the arm accurately "flew from one
pre-programmed spot to the next
Braking of the arm was normal and
smooth in both automatic and
manual drive
Although the STS-2 crew did not
pick up a payload with the arm. both
astronauts performed manual
approaches to a grapple fixture in
the cargo bay and they found the
arm to control smooth l y, very much
like ground simulators The second
crew also began tests to see how
movement rf the arm interacts with
Orbiter motions. Problems with TV
cameras reduced the documentation
of these tests. but the crew reported
that firings of the small vernier
thrusters did no' influence arm
position, nor did arm mc,..ons trigger
attitude ad!ustment firings by the
Orbiter
The prime objecc, e of STS-3 arm
test ,- was to test it loaded with a
payload First. though, the crew nad
to f:nish tests left over from the
shortened STS-2 mission, particularly
a verification of the computers ability
to automatically stop an arm joint
from rotating past the limit of its
mobility. The third crew completed 48
hours of arm tests includ,ng one
unplanned demonstration of the
elbow cameras ability to photograph
Columbias nose area during an on-
orbit search for missing tiles.
A Shuttle payload the 186
kilogram (413 pound) PI isma
Diagnostics Package, was grappled
by the end effector. removed
manually from its berth in the cargo
bay and maneuvered automatically
around the Orbiter in support of OFT
space environrr:ent studies
Gordon Fullerton deployed and re-
berthed the package a total of three
times. and -was impressed with the
arms ease and responsiveness.
Before one such deployment the arm
automatically found its way'-, w,thin
3.8 centimeters ( 11 5 inches) of the
grapple poir t. in accord with pre-
flight predictions
TV cameras provided excellent
vision of arm operations in bot i
sunshine and dE rkness. and the
STS-4 crew reported that nighttime
operations. althouah margii a l . were
still possible after three of the six
payload bay cameras faded. The third
and fourth crews continued
evaluation of vehicle interactions with
arrn motion by performing roll
maneuvers as the arm hold payl^ads
straight up from the cargo bay This
was done with the Plasma
Diagnostics Package on ;TI -3 and
with the twice-as-heavy Inducad
Environmert Contamination Monitor
on STS-4. In both cases the crew
noted a slight swaying of the arm
when the vehicle stopped which was
expected
Further tests of these dynamic
responses will be done on later
mis-sions Tne Remote Manipulator
System is designed to m,we a
payload o. 29.250 k!lograrr.3 (65 W)
pounds). but was tested :)r.ly with
masses under 450 kilograms (1000
pounds) during OFT Futu fe arm tests
will graduate to heaver p,y.oads
ullicrimL r: ^" r;
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insulation that will survive intact to fly
on the next mission.
Columbias aluminum surface was
covered with several different types of
insulation during the test program.
with their distribution based on
predicted heating patterns rhese
included more than 30.000 rigid silica
tiles of two types (black for high
temperatures. white fo lower) that
account for over 700 o of the Orbiters
surface area Since these tiles were a
critical new technology for the Space
Shuttle. their performance was a
mayor concern of the test program
As soon as Columbia opened its
payload bay doors in orbit on the
first mission. TV cameras clearly
missing from the aft engine pods,
having been shaker, loose during the
vehicles ascent. These tiles had not
been densified—a process that
strengthens the bond between the
and Orbiter—as had all the tiles in
rntical areas. and every tile installed
after October, 1979 None of the
densified tiles were lost during the
test flights
On each flight there was some
damage to the surfaces during both
la:inch and entry. Hundreds of pits
and gouges were discovered during
vehicle inspections after STS-1, then
again after STS-2 While the damage
was not critical. many tiles needed to
be replaced. Crew reports. launch
pad cameras and cockpit films
STS-3 environmental survey using
Plasma Diagnostics Package also
tested arm motion in pre-
programmed stops.
reco rded chunks of ice and or
insulation falling from the external
tank during ascent as well as launch
pad debris flying up and hitting the
Orbiter, and these impacts were
blamed for most of the tile damage.
Over the course of the test
program various solutions to this
problem were implemented A
general clean-up of the pad before
launch and the removal of a
particular insulation that had kept
coming loose from the booster
rockets cut down significantly on pad
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debris On the external tank. certain
pieces of ice-forming hardware were
removed As a result. impact damage
to the tiles was greatly reduced.
While some 300 tiles needed to be
replaced after STS-1. fewer than 40
were replaced after STS-4
Weather also inflicted its share of
tile damage during the test program.
Factory waterproofing of new tiles
does not survive the heat of a re-
entry and so Columbia had to be
sprayed with a commercial
waterproofing agent after each
mission so as not to absorb rainwater
on the pad. The waterproofing agent
was found to loosen tile bonds where
it formed puddles. though. and
STS-3 lost some tiles as a result.
Then. while STS-4 sat on the pad
awaiting launch. a heavy hail and
rainstorm allowed an estimated 540
kilograms (1200 pounds) of rain
water to be absorbed into the porous
tiles through pits made by hailstones
This water added unwanted weight
during ascent and later caused
motion disturbances to the vehicle
when it evaporated into space.
Shuttle engineers now plan to use an
it lc:ction procedure that will
waterproof the Interior of the tiles
between future missions.
As a whole. the Thermal Protection
System kept the Orbiter's skin within
required limits during the OFT flights.
even during the hottest periods of re-
entry For the test programs last
Columbia was covered with several
types of insulation during she t: st
program, all with different heat
load capacities. Reinforced carbon-
carbon was used where tempera-
tures exceeded 1260 C (2300 F),
whereas a flexible insulation was
ad-!ovate for the cooler engine
pods.
three flights the crews performed
short-duration push-over pull-up"
maneuvers--changes in the vehicles
pitch angle--designed In part to test
the effects of different attitudes on
heating. Heating on the control
surfaces was increased In stages over
the four flights, and on STS 3 and 4
the angle of entry into the
17
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atmosphere was flown steeper to
collect data under even more
demanding conditions. On each
flight hundreds of heat sensors
placed around the vehicle, next to its
skin and at various depths in the
insulation contributed data on re-
entry heating. In most areas these
sensors reported temperatures
consistent with pre-flight predictions_
Notable excepticns were the aft
engine pods, wnere some low-
temperature flexible insulation was
replaced with high-temperature black
tiles after STS-1 showed high
te-iperatures and scorching.
Data collected during the OFT
program will allow engineers to
co tinue with planned weight
reductions and changes in insulation,
inc , uding the replacement of the
white tiles with an advanced flexible
insulation
Aerodynamic Tests
At the same time as Shuttle
heating was being evaluated
Columbia was also being tested as
the worlds most advanced glider
during its return to Earth at the end
of each mission. The major objective
of aerodynamic testing was to verify
controlled flight over a wide range of
altitudes (beginning at 120.000
meters (400.000 feet) where the air is
very thin.) and ve!ocines. from
hypersonic to subsonic. In both
manual and automatic control modes
the vehicle flew very reliably and in
agreement with wind tunnel
predictions.
The OFT tests required large
amounts of data from tho
Aerodynamic Coefficient
Identification Package (ACIP) as well
as ground tracking data arid plot
reports on vehicle handling. Data
analysis will continue many flights
into the operational era as engineers
refine their models.
In the early, computer-controlled
phase of re-entry the Shuttle keeps
its nose up at a steady angle of
attack as it descended This angle
was 40 for the test flights. but it will
often be shallower later in the Shuttle
Post-landing inspection of tiles on
lower surface of body flap reveals
damage caused by impacts and
scorching of tile fillers.
program During this time the vehicle
also executes several rolling S-turns
designed to reduce lift and velocity.
These were successfully tested as
both manual and automatic
maneuvers.
There were also a number of
special test mareuvers—up to 23 on
STS-2—performed on each flight
either as programmed inputs by the
guidance computer or as control
stick commands by the crew. where
the vehicles flaps and rudder were
positioned to stimulate more
demanding flight conditions or to fi l
data gaps where wind tunnel testing
was not adequate.
They included the push-over'pull-
up" changes in pitch angle that
m^mentanly simulate a different
vehicle center of gravit y
 so that
engineers can c redict the
aerodynamics with different payloads
in the cargo bay There were also
strEss tests on the rudder and
control flaps at various speeds and
pressures. and exercises where the
"autopilot" was called on to correct
the Shuttles attitude after the crew
deliberately induced other motions.
These corrections were executed
perfectly On the first flight Columba
even made an unplanned-for
18
ORIGINAL FACE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
correction in the angle of its aft body
flap. While engineers had predicted
an angel of 8 to 9- for the flap at
high altitudes. the actual angle
required to maintain the proper
attitude was 14°. The computers
made this adjustment automatically.
In the thin upper atmosphere the
Shuttle uses its reaction control
thrusters to help maintain its attitude.
Over the four test flights these
thrusters showed a greater-than-
expected influence on the vehicle's
motion in the atmosphere This may
allow engineers. as they learn more
about Shuttle flight, to reduce the
reliance on these thrusters or
perhaps even phase out their use
altogether during re-entry. This would
save on reaction control fuel.
The Orbiters navigation and
guidance equipment also served well
during re-entry. Probes that monitor
air speeds were success'ully
deployed at speeds below
approximately Mach 3 (three times
the speed of sound), and navigational
aids by which the Orbiter checks its
position relative to the around
worked well with only minor
adjustments.
Unlike returning Apollo capsules.
the Space Shuttle has some
crossrange capability—it can deviate
from a purely ballistic path by gliding
right or left of its aim point and so.
even though it has no powered t;lrust
during final approach it does have a
degree of control over where it lands.
The largest crossrange demonstrated
during the test program was 930
kilometers (580 miles) on STS-4. and
this will be increased on later flights.
OFT astronauts flying the Shuttle in
calm air reported that Columbia
showed tighter control than had their
Shuttle training aircraft. and called it
a "fantastic flying machine."
The Space Shuttle has the
capability ID return to Earth with full
computer control from atmospheric
entry to the runway. (luring the test
grogram, however, Columbia was not
landed automatically The STS-1
approach and landing was fully
manual. On STS-2 the auto-land
control was engaged at 1500 meters
(5000 feet) altitude. and the crew
took over at 90 meters (300 feet).
Similarly, STS-3 flew on auto-land
from 3000 meters (10.000 feet) down
to 39 meters (130 feet) before the
commander took stick control. 1 1
 ..as
decided after an error in nose
attitude during the STS-3 landing
that the crew should not take control
of the vehicle so snort a time before
touchdown. The STS-4 crew
therefore took control from the auto-
land as Columbia moved into its final
shallow glide slope at 600 meters
;2000 feet). Full auto-land capability
remained to be demonstrated after
STS-5, as did a landing with a
runway crosswind.
Stress gages on the landing gear
and crew reports indicate that a
Shuttle landing is very smooth—
smoother than most commercial
airplanes. Roll-out on the runway
after touchdown was well within the
4500 meter (15.000 foot) de.;Ign limit
on each landing. but the actual
touchdown points were all
considerably beyond the planned
touchdown points. This is because
the Shuttle has a higher ratio of lift
to drag near the ground than was
expected. and 'floats" farther down
the runway.
Ground Work
Most of the work of the Space
Transportation System is actually
done on the ground, most of it at the
Kennedy Space Center in Florida.
The OFT program verified thousands
of ground procedures from mating
the vehicle before launch to
refurbishing the Solid Rocket
Boosters and ferrying the Orbiter
form landing site to launch pad
As the test program progressed
many ground operations were
changed or stream l ined as engineers
learned more about the vehicles
capabilities. Certain tasks that had
been necessary for an witried vehicle
before STS-1 could be eliminated
altogether. As a result of this learning
the "turnaround" time between
missions was shortened
dramatically—from 188 days for
STS-2 to 75 days between STS-4 and
STS-5.
Major timesaving steps included:
o Leaving cryogenic fuels in
their onboard storage tanks
between flights rather than
rem	 g them after landing
w Altern^,ing the use of primary
and backup systems on each
flight rather than checking out
both sets of redundant
hardware on the ground before
each launch
• Reducing the number of tests
of critical systems as they
proved flight-worthy from
mission to mission
By :he end of the test program, the
Space Transportation Systen . had
demonstrated ontime launch and
landing (STS-4). The next mission
(STS-5) delivered a commercial
payload into orbit and so
inaugurated the operational Shuttle
era. M my tests were still to he do me.
The Shut:- will gradually progress to
heavier payloads. But. not until the
third Orbiter Discovery, is a Shuttle
scheduled to have full 29,250
kilog ram (65.000 pound) capability,
due to a combination of weight
reductions and engine upgrading.
Manned aspects of the program such
as spacewalks and seven-person
crews had not yet been verified, nor
had the Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite System (TDRSS) for on-orbit
communication, or the first Spacelab.
Satellite servicing, launches from
California, and landings in Florida
had riot been tried.
But the Orbital Flight Teat program
did verify that the Space
Transporiation System is sound and
ready for the scientific, commercial
and defense applications of the
1980's. Engineers will continue using
data from the test program to
upgrade the cu rrent fleet of Shuttles
and to begin designing the space
vehicles of the next century.
19
